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Abstract: In his article "Inanimate Speech from Lovecraft to Žižek" Apple Z. Igrek explores an influential line of reasoning associated with our contemporary loss of the Real. The argument describes
how the contingencies and nuances of social life have been reduced to an operational, friction-free,
and homogeneous realm of signs. Slavoj Žižek contends that our inherently traumatic relationship
with the Other is being foreclosed and replaced by an omnipresent technological screen of virtual
communication. The danger of this shift, identified as the "digital break," is that it facilitates an extraordinary form of divine violence which strikes back at the social system originally intended to eradicate all things abnormal and destructive. Drawing on H.P. Lovecraft's horror fiction, Igrek proposes
another way of thinking through these interrelated motifs of technology, fear, social media, and abject
otherness. Instead of presuming a virtual demarcation between radical ambivalence and its allencompassing, catastrophic assimilation, Igrek suggests that the predominant conceptualization of
this so-called rupture is fraught with inconsistencies.
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Apple Z. IGREK
Inanimate Speech from Lovecraft to Žižek
The view that contemporary forms of power and communication have transformed our everyday activities and relationships with the result that we can no longer distinguish what is real from what is fake
or artificial, is widespread. A variety of philosophers and cultural critics, from Georges Bataille and
Ernest Becker to Michel Foucault and Slavoj Žižek, have argued, in some fashion or another, that the
modern quest for biopolitical control and perpetual consumption lends itself to catastrophic tendencies. Our problem is that we live in an age of hyperbolic positivity, which is to say that the inherent
tension or opposition within meaning has been reduced, or is on the way to being reduced, to a seamless exchange of meaningless information (Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation 82-83). In this process through which we exclude from ourselves "every essential possibility of secrecy and every link
between responsibility and the keeping of a secret," Jacques Derrida sees the "inevitable passage"
from democracy to oppression (The Gift of Death 34). Žižek makes a similar claim in The Plague of
Fantasies when he writes that we are currently dominated by an invisible spectral frame, one whose
fetishization of power is defined by its unlikely disappearance: "the postmodern transparency of the
process of production is false in so far as it obfuscates the immaterial virtual order which effectively
runs the show" (103). The transparency of power, in other words, has simply become a more effective
means of disguising the truth of the matter, which is that we are more highly regulated and disciplined
than ever before. The appropriate response to this atonal world of immaterial delusion, as Žižek proposes in his In Defense of Lost Causes, is to expose its underlying secret tonality (31). While the basic
argument manifests itself in a number of ways, depending upon the methodological approach of each
author, it can always be identified by an apocalyptic tone coupled with a romantic appeal to the heterogeneous Other. While this is not a return to exteriority in itself, something which can be perceived
apart from the limits and rules of everyday social life, there is still an assumption that some forms of
experience are more open to the outside than others.
The first moment of this catastrophic line of thought gestures toward its own ambivalence. The
apocalyptic romantic reminds us, and rightfully so, that human experience is forever torn between life
and death, rationality and irrationality, as well as the human and the inhuman. As George Bataille
writes in Erotism, there is something infinite buried deep within us, something which we can never
fully integrate into our systems of control and mastery: "There is in nature and there subsists in man
a movement which always exceeds the bounds, that can never be anything but partially reduced to
order. We are generally unable to grasp it" (40). We cannot grasp the movement which subsists within
us precisely because it is self-contradictory, and although we directly and immediately participate in
its boundless effervescence, we do so only by way of a fragmentary perspective. If this paradox of
atheistic mysticism pervades and constitutes us in our very essence, if the finite self and the infinite
other are necessarily bound together, then we simply cannot escape the radical ambivalence which
defines us: "If this is 'incoherent', then existence is incoherence. In Bataille's terms, existence is
'ambiguous' in the way the sacred is ambiguous, or 'equivocal' in the way culture itself is equivocal"
(Connor 100). More than fifty years later, Žižek speaks of subjectivity and desire in these same terms
of an underlying radical gap or incoherence. The very ontological Thing which upsets and disturbs us
most is furthermore exactly that which sustains the symbolic density of subjective existence (Plague,
49). Drawing from the terminology of both Immanuel Kant and Jacques Lacan, Žižek distinguishes
reality from the Real by showing how human perception creates a relationship with the unknowable,
with the traumatic Thing-in-itself, by way of a negative magnitude (or the objet petit a); that is to
say, by transforming the unrepresentable abyss of nothingness into a phenomenological object which
concretely embodies the very lack which it covers over and represses. In this sense, from Bataille to
Žižek, the foundations of social and linguistic meaning are often traced back to an enigmatic experience of contingency which shows itself to be irreducible to the systems of meaning for which it is responsible (128-29)
None of this suggests, however, that the radical contingency of human experience is attainable in
a pure form. Bataille was always aware of the limitations of a return to unrestrained energy or nature,
and thus warned in the preface to his Accursed Share that "real life … knows nothing of purely produc-
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tive expenditure; in actuality, it knows nothing of purely nonproductive expenditure either" (12). Expenditure, for Bataille, was construed as a violent, dazzling release of energy and resources from the
narrowly defined interests of a rational economy. But rational thinking and utilitarian interests should
not and cannot be entirely ignored. In fact, as Peter Tracey Connor argues, it is only the imaginary
system of thinking which can overcome its own limitations: "Bataille was committed to the life of
mind, and to thinking, for thinking alone can lead to what he calls 'violent thinking'" (158). The violent, excessive ambivalence of life which haunts us in our everyday habitual modes of thought cannot
be reached or experienced independently of those same ritualistic restrictions. Žižek argues along similar lines: we are certainly able to transcend our artificial environments and linguistic systems, but only when we focus upon something fixed, an ideological constant which frames our return to the traumatic Real. In this vein, he quotes what he describes as a racist and sexist joke about Italian men who
cannot perform sexually until their lovers whisper into their ears what they've been doing with other
men (The Plague 65). The truth disguised and revealed by the myth of this joke is that emotional and
physical contact, even for lovers, is never sustained on its own without some modicum of phantasmic
support. Žižek's point here follows the Lacanian notion of the ego and how it emerges in the context of
alienation, by means of its identification with an exterior, fixed mirror-image. The phatasmic, symbolic
support which facilitates pleasure and ecstasy is thus an extension of the immobile structures of selfconsciousness without which we could never transcend ourselves in moments of intersubjective
jouissance. It is in fact this version of dialectical materialism which allows Žižek to maneuver around
the false antitheses of realism and idealism. His conception of the Real, or the "immediate," is itself
always already mediated by the human symbolic process, even as it bends and skews it: "the Real as
'impossible' is precisely the excess of 'immediacy' which cannot be 'reified' in a fetish, the unfathomable X which, although nowhere present, curves/distorts any space of symbolic representation" (The
Plague 98). Grounding human existence and desire in the pathological Real, Žižek is thus able to resist
the fantasies of symbolization without thereby eradicating their paradoxical necessity.
Nevertheless, the apocalyptic romantics tend to privilege a distinctive encounter with the ambivalent Thing which sustains our symbolic density. This encounter has been described as a kind of exposure, opening, transgression, event, reversal, passionate experience, rupture, decision, and so forth.
Bataille himself spoke of transgression as a movement of self-sacrifice, in which we confusedly mix
opposites: "Here life is mingled with death, but death is simultaneously a sign of life, a way into the
infinite" (Erotism 91). The experience of transgression is therefore the apex of sacrificial ambivalence.
Following Bataille's path, Foucault observed that transgression incessantly crosses a limit in which it
discovers its entire trajectory, while it nonetheless forces that limit to "face the fact of its imminent
disappearance, to find itself in what it excludes" (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice 34). The sovereign moment is exceptional in being open to the other, in bringing together opposites, and heightening our awareness of death. This is clearly an extraordinary experience, one which is opposed to everyday sentiments of disgust and ressentiment. It is thus a primordial affirmation: "Nothing is more
alien to this experience than the demonic character who, true to his nature, 'denies everything.'
Transgression opens onto a scintillating and constantly affirmed world" (37). Peter Tracey Connor, also
echoing Bataille, contends that the man of servile sentimentality fears his ultimate meaninglessness
and takes refuge in projects and delusions; whereas the sovereign person avows "the ambiguous attraction-repulsion that the spectacle of immense crimes provokes in us" (141). Using the language of
exoticism, strange attractors, and the secret of the Other, Jean Baudrillard defends a similar kind of
affirmation. It involves, as much for Baudrillard as Bataille and Foucault before him, the disappearance
of the subject in a world which moves beyond the positive and useful. Once again a distinction is
made, and it is much better to open oneself to sacrifice and nothingness than to remain trapped by
the progressive dialectics of truth, reason, and self-awareness: "I have lost any trace of desire of my
own. I answer only to something non-human — something inscribed not within me but solely in the
objective and arbitrary vicissitudes of the world's signs" (The Transparency of Evil 173). What is objective, in this sense, is essentially the otherness of what cannot be reduced to familiarity or mirrorlike representations. Similar to Žižek's pathological Real, the objective, inhuman Other as a strange
attractor is the antagonism from which the subject draws life and energy without thus being reconciled
to it.
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The question I explore is whether this distinction between one kind of opening and another is viable. As already put forth, according to this predominant line of catastrophic thinking, it is the affirmation of radical ambivalence vis-à-vis an absolute outside which needs to be distinguished from everyday modes of indifference, repression, and homogeneity. The tension between the inside and the outside, the limit and the infinite, should be maintained rather than domesticated and absorbed into
structures of perpetual simulation. But at the same time, as noted above, there is no pure access to
the Thing-in-itself, and our exposure to it is always already marked by calculative rules of self-interest
and language. Hence, the theoretical and practical divisions made between sovereign and servile
forms of ambivalence are questionable, and it is far from inconceivable that the paradoxes of transgression are no greater than those of normalcy or rule-bound behavior – not as long as the latter are
themselves a priori susceptible to what they putatively exclude. Nevertheless, an influential body of
thought, shared by more than one methodological tradition, argues in favor of these divisions and
warns against their practical, everyday solidification in modern and postmodern societies.
Žižek contends that the virtual has always played a significant role in communication and subjectivity. As already indicated above, the sexual is never purely sexual: quoting Lacan extensively, Žižek
reiterates the point that man's virility, for example, is sustained only by means of the "absent-virtual
Phallus" (The Plague 151). Likewise a judge requires his insignia to exert "real" authority. Our symbolic institutions and phantasmic narratives, which belong to the realm of the virtual, are absolutely necessary in the performance of real, concrete activities. If a distinction is to be made, then, between our
intrinsic, everyday ambivalence – which lays the groundwork for transgressive practices – and the
simulacrum which puts an end to that ambivalence, it is crucial for these writers to explain this historical development. Žižek himself refers to it as the "digital break" whereby all distances are suspended
and our relationships to real bodily others, to our neighbors, is replaced by screen specters (The
Plague 154). In this sense, it follows that the real presence of the Other, in contemporary digital society, is quickly disappearing. Paul Virilio, whom Žižek cites, makes nearly the same argument, albeit
in different theoretical terms. The shift from the symbolic to the simulacrum, or what he also calls
endocolonization, mass psychosis, and temporal compression, is now taking place because of the
transformation of multi-media technologies which renders everything instantaneously accessible, with
neither obstacles nor blind spots. Hence, our fundamental experience of time is changing so that
chronological succession — involving the past, the present, and the future – is replaced with an immersive tele-presence (The Information Bomb 118). Everything, it would appear, is subsumed by the
virtual: the presence of the Other, the duration of time, the reality of an outside world, the singularity
of a person, and so forth ad infinitum. Baudrillard defines this postmodern evolution most succinctly
when he writes, "There is no separation any longer, no empty space, no absence: you enter the
screen and the visual image unhindered. … You slip on your own life like a data suit" (Screened Out
177). If there is indeed a division between symbolic and simulated forms of traumatic ambivalence,
whereby the possibility of transgression develops out of the former as opposed to the latter, then the
digital break will be defined as the virtual assimilation of the gap or separation which Virilio, Žižek,
and Baudrillard have all associated, in one way or another, with our symbolic underpinnings. To the
extent that human desire reflects this gap between the noumenal Thing-in-itself and its sublimated
representation, it follows for Žižek and others that postmodern ideology is the ubiquitous collapse of
these otherwise antithetical poles. The uncanny, oscillating imbalance pervading all of human experience is in this way covered over and excluded in the very process of its contemporary, ideological assimilation.
Having elaborated a complex relationship between our exclusionary practices and the radical, systematic closure of social reality which follows in their wake, the majority of these thinkers also trace
these modern and postmodern developments to a globalized politics of fear and domination. In some
of his final lectures, Derrida spoke of the impossible "making-known" of a traumatic event such as the
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, and how our attempts to archive the event in today's media landscape is intimately connected to a multi-faceted politics of exploitation and fear: "In
all cases it has to do with knowing how to cause fear, knowing how to terrorize by making known. And
this terror, on both sides of the front, is undeniably effective, real, concrete" (The Beast and the Sovereign 39). In our desire to make sense of an impossible event through endlessly repeated images
and the process of making-known, we succumb to the politics of terror which penetrates the lives of
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all those individuals who are captivated by its omnipresent spectacle. This applies to all such events.
Speaking of another catastrophic tragedy, the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia, Virilio contends that we are besieged by our own satellites and media such that the "City-World is now doubled
with the looping of terrorizing images in a 'state of siege' of the viewer's mind" (City 85). When we
speak of the role of media and technology in terms of cultural consequences, and how they maintain a
firm, trance-like grip on the postmodern subject's perception of reality, we are thus describing, according to Žižek, Derrida, and Virilio, a critical break with any previous formations of symbolic, repressive power.
Foucault elucidated the historical origins of this power in great detail and more exhaustively than
anyone else. In Discipline and Punish, he writes that every society has imposed constraints and regulations on the human body, but that the eighteenth century initiated new "projects of docility" (136).
At this historical juncture, the scale of control became more subtle and detailed, applied itself directly
to the forces and movements of the body, and exercised a new mode of power without interruption.
The new disciplinary technologies were distinguished by their meticulous, all-pervasive subjectification
of human individuals. The dream of modern power was therefore to expose all of our behavior and
consciousness to the homogenizing techniques of control, knowledge, and surveillance: "The perfect
disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly" (173).
And such an omnipresent gaze fights back against the mortality, ambivalence, and confusion of life
which is deeply embedded within all of us: "Behind the disciplinary mechanisms can be read the
haunting memory of 'contagions', of the plague, of rebellions, crimes, vagabondage, desertions, people who appear and disappear, live and die in disorder" (198). It should also be said that for Foucault,
as well as for Baudrillard and Virilio, the cultural amplification of fear and domination made possible by
dint of these new techniques of power was hardly confined to the modern penitentiary; networks of
coercion have subsequently made their way into all of society, such that the predominant problem today arises from "the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging
powers which, through the proliferation of new disciplines, they bring with them" (306). We therefore
observe how our contemporary landscape of power and deception can be traced back to eighteenthcentury Enlightenment reforms throughout a variety of institutions, while still constituting an extraordinary break in terms of the ubiquitous infiltration of these mechanisms in all aspects of life.
As argued previously, there is constitutive gap shared by language and its other; and thus, as
Žižek reminds us in his recent book Violence, it is the nature of symbolization to violently impose its
rules upon the strange unity of the world around us: "[Language] dismembers the thing, destroying
its organic unity, treating its parts and properties as autonomous. It inserts the thing into a field of
meaning which is ultimately external to it" (61). This objective form of violence, which Žižek contrasts
with more visible and obvious forms of brutality (1-2), cannot be extirpated from our everyday, nearly
invisible background of human perception. Indeed, the delusional attempt to do so leads to another
form of objective violence which Žižek labels "systemic." Akin to Baudrillard's simulacrum or Foucault's
disciplinary networks, systemic violence neutralizes the inherent ambiguities and tensions associated
with our symbolic structures of discourse. The "liberal communists" of the world (an epithet used to
describe today's leading capitalists, such as Bill Gates and Georges Soros) are dismayed by poverty
and fundamentalist terrorism, but fail to see, according to Žižek, that they directly implement the very
conditions of systemic violence which thereupon sustain the globalized status quo (36-37). Ironically,
it is their liberal tolerance of others which puts them on an obsessive path of neutralization, whereby
the most disconcerting aspects of concrete, genuine intersubjectivity are rendered perfectly harmless.
In this post-political world of administration and pragmatic economics, we are motivated by a calculus
of generic happiness and blind optimism such that, as we have already seen with Foucault and Virilio,
our pleasant affability is increasingly overshadowed by a totalizing expansion of neurotic phobias:
"fear of immigrants, fear of crime, fear of godless sexual depravity, fear of the excessive state itself,
with its burden of high taxation, fear of ecological catastrophe, fear of harassment" (40-41). It is, paradoxically, the modern subject's attempt to cleanse intersubjective relationships of everything dark
and impure, to implement a new globalized version of economics and communication which overcomes
our backward, ignorant traits of intolerance and mutual suspicion, it is this very attempt to rectify our
deep-seated alienation which reinforces it all the more.
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Extrapolating from the first stages of immanent malaise and catastrophe, several prominent writers over the last century have predicted an impending global disaster. It is telling that Freud ends
Civilization and Its Discontents with the gloomy observation that men have acquired such control over
the forces of nature "that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to
the last man" (112). Bataille confirms the same self-destructive tendency in our attempts to subordinate energy to a restricted economy with finite goals: "[I]f the system can no longer grow, or if the
excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must
be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically" (The Accursed Share 21). Making nearly the
same argument, Ernest Becker warns against our cultural tendency to outwit death, to devote ourselves exclusively to the symbolization of life, by virtue of the "immortality myths" affirmed and propagated in a particular society: "and the price for this kind of ambition is to make the earth an even
more eager graveyard than it naturally is" (Escape from Evil 96). Much like Becker, Baudrillard writes
in The Vital Illusion that we humans dream of transcending death — and everything corporeal — at
the risk of falling back into our original entropic state of primordial nothingness (18). Foucault reframes this paradox in terms of biopower, noting that the same regulatory techniques and bodies of
knowledge which are intended to preserve life go beyond themselves in the development of atomic
power and creating viruses which have devastating global consequences (Society Must Be Defended
253-54). Foucault's solution to this apparent contradiction in the deployment of biopower, which simultaneously protects and endangers the life of large populations, is to highlight the racist underpinnings of modern states and societies: "When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which
is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed" (256).
Hence, if the new administrative powers over life and utility seemingly reduce our exposure to
death, illness, and madness, that is not to suggest that we are any more secure from precisely those
phenomena which are considered to be most threatening; and in fact it is racism which facilitates the
ever looming possibility of massive conflicts and catastrophes. As with Freud, Bataille, and Becker before them, Foucault and Baudrilllard observe a causal connection between contemporary society's tendency to dissociate life from death – to promote the totalization of life at the expense of losing our
primordial awareness of the vague and desolate – and that which follows in the wake of our reifying
practices, namely, a violent, explosive breaking point of the system which otherwise transcends human mortality. Whether it is deemed a "general accident" in Virilio or "divine violence" in Žižek (the
latter variation being embraced by Žižek as a corrective to our unjust systemic foundations of mere
life, it is certain that for each of these writers there are significant repercussions for the one-sided repudiation of ambivalence. If there is still hope, it is not the hope of dialectical perfection; but rather,
as Derrida puts forth in an essay defending Bataille, we must find our way back to a unique, asymmetrical relationship in which life and death, the subject and its sacrifice, are united together in a sovereign moment which disrupts the omnipresent subjugation of an administrative discourse and politics. My contention, however, is that the affirmation of this rupture is no different, metaphysically or
ethically speaking, from its systematized domestication. The limit of discourse to which Derrida alludes, if it is indeed susceptible to an irruption uncovering something existing beyond human finitude,
beyond instrumental rationality and cultural homogeneity, will therefore always be exposed to that
which it superficially represses. What is so perfectly haunting apropos of the outside, and whatever
stimulates us from beyond ourselves, is that there are no degrees of closeness or distance according
to which we should affirm that we are more or less aware of our sovereignty in comparison to others.
H.P. Lovecraft, more obsessively than anyone since Edgar Allen Poe, depicts for us this primeval connection between ourselves and what exists, in a vague and hostile form, at all points of convergence
along the limit of human awareness. In his short story "The Tomb," the narrator immediately shares
his thoughts on perception, indicating that the demarcation between our real and unreal selves is
quite precarious, and that a broader perspective shows us "that all things appear as they do only by
virtue of the delicate individual physical and mental media through which we are made conscious of
them" (The Tomb and Other Tales 7). That which lies in wait for us, at the bottom of the oceans and
buried in serpentine tunnels beneath the earth's surface, can only ever be imagined according to symbols and metaphors which ineluctably fall short in their representations. But they only fall short insofar
as they themselves are exposed to a "thing," or the Thing-in-itself, which has no limit – and thus pen-
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etrates all limits at every level of discourse, habit, gesture, cultural awareness, mediated technology
and communication, and so forth. If we can neither enclose nor culturally assimilate what is outside,
the strange attractor about which Baudrillard speaks so highly, this can only be because it touches us
everywhere at once. In this fashion Lovecraft's main characters inevitably find themselves lost in a
world where the recognizable and familiar becomes mixed with something unknown, unfamiliar, and
yet all-pervasive. One such person, while under the influence of a hypnotic machine created by a disturbed friend of his, bears witness to a shadowy chaos of sights and sounds in which the unusual is
superimposed upon his ordinary perceptions: "Indescribable shapes both alive and otherwise were
mixed in disgusting disarray, and close to every known thing were whole worlds of alien, unknown
entities. It likewise seemed that all the known things entered into the composition of other unknown
things, and vice versa" (The Lurking Fear and Other Stories 64). In Lovecraft's world, we can never
fully grasp what is unknown, as there is always a remainder, but for precisely this reason we cannot
go beyond it or escape it, as it will always bear down upon us in a multitude of frightful, nameless
shapes.
Despite his mystical outlook, the above considerations brace us for Lovecraft's dream-infested hybrid of bizarre and anthropomorphic metaphors. One of his characters, Jervas Dudley, confesses that
his "rather original ideas regarding life and death had caused [him] to associate the cold clay with the
breathing body in a vague fashion" ("The Tomb" 10). In "The Festival," black gravestones are analogously described as rising up "ghoulishly through the snow like the decayed fingernails of a gigantic
corpse" (The Tomb and Other Tales 19). In both examples the frightful ambiguity shared between life
and death, the animate and the inanimate, is made disturbingly clear. Lovecraft certainly applies this
concept of ambiguity to a wide range of phenomena. In the same story the protagonist meets a mysterious old man whose face has the appearance of a mask, and at one point it is dislodged "from what
should have been his head" (26). But in a later story the main character, Kenton Stanfield, relies upon
various forms of technological devices, such as an oxygen mask, to survive on Venus where he and his
company are exploring for crystals, thereby suggesting an uncanny resemblance between what we
imagine as human and what typically shocks us as monstrous or inhuman. The same method is to be
found in his sundry descriptions of jewelry, statues, paintings, architecture, monuments, and temples:
in each case the natural and the contrived are united together in a kind of self-referential symbolism.
In "The Shadow over Innsmouth," faint sounds of the unseen are heard coming out of boarded-up,
seemingly deserted houses; while in "The Call of Cthulhu," a young art student dreams of "Cyclopean
cities of titan blocks and sky-flung monoliths" (H.P. Lovecraft Tales 171), below which, from an indeterminate location, emanates an indescribable voice or sensation which in fact may not be a voice at
all. The image of Cthulhu, an immortal alien temporarily buried in that Cyclopean masonry, is carved
into a clay bas-relief when the student dreams of those monstrous cities, implying for us, by the end
of the story, a subconscious form of communication taking place by means of that same grotesque,
scaly, unworldly image. The idea that Lovecraft is once again infusing something inanimate and objective, in this case the artistic, subconscious rendering of Cthulhu, with something else living or at least
partially alive, is reinforced by his description of another image of Cthulhu – that of a statuette or cult
fetish – as being "abnormally life-like" (176). Moreover, the great temple where he continues to live is
a place of burial, a kind of tomb from which he sends out thoughts to the living inhabitants of earth. It
is thus not at all certain if we can sharply, methodically distinguish the living from the dead, or the
humans from the aliens, in Lovecraft's tales. Reflecting upon this theme of communication from beyond life, from beyond the realm of signs and objects, it becomes exceedingly difficult to extricate the
material representation of absolute exteriority from the enigmatic source out of which that representation arises.
It should not be presumed, however, that those pictorial and architectural representations exist
externally to ourselves in the objective universe of pure discourse. If this were the case, then it would
be accurate to claim, as many do, that those images are subject to a historical process of reification in
which they are separated from their social and material conditions. In Lovecraft, the images associated with sculptures, paintings, and architecture are deeply interwoven with the subject's impression of
an overwhelming, incommensurable outside. The outside, which is both tangible and intangible, exists
beyond us as well as within us: for Lovecraft it is the infinite, abject exteriority of nature as well as the
traumatic opacity of inner experience. Thus, what appears to us in symbolic form participates in these
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two irreconcilable realms, the exterior and the interior, without reducing one to the other in various
modes of simplified deception. What appears to be solely human or symbolic is invariably immersed in
a broader set of illimitable circumstances. In "The Festival," a staircase winds its way down from a
trap-door of a church to a crypt below the church and then to the shores of an abyss from which an
oily river flows out of "the blackest gulfs of immemorial ocean" The Tomb and Other Tales 23). What is
truly fascinating is the protagonist's subtle description of his descent into this inner world of consciousness and exteriority: "It was a silent, shocking descent, and I observed after a horrible interval
that the walls and steps were changing in nature, as if chiselled out of the solid rock" (23). The continuity shared by the mundane and the infinite abyss is undoubtedly exemplified through this visual
metaphor of the winding, spiral staircase. In "The Strange High House in the Mist," an ancient house is
observed at the peak of an inaccessible cliff which appears to be one with the firmament. The only
door to this house was to be found on the side facing the empty sky, thus once again intimating a
strange connection between what is artificial and its silent, infinite aspect – where "aspect" should be
understood in all of its overlapping meanings (an appearance, component, bearing, exposure, interpretation, etc.). Perhaps more explicitly, in "The Evil Clergyman," a man who witnesses a surreal confrontation between a nervous, grave-looking man and a group of clerics finds himself surprisingly
transformed afterward. While the spectacle takes place in a haze of events which seemed to have
transpired in the past, the persecuted clergyman glides toward the bystander and exerts a strange
influence over him. At the last moment the protagonist escapes and returns to his normal state of existence, except for the fact, as he soon learns when looking at himself in the reflection of a mirror,
that he himself has taken on the appearance of the evil clergyman (H.P. Lovecraft Tales 138-39).
Likewise, in the short story "The Outsider," an individual who is born in a fantastical setting beneath
the earth, in what he assumes to be a castle replete with dark passages and crumbling corridors,
learns of his true condition after climbing a black tower leading to an unknown realm in the distant
expanse above his wretched birthplace. Entering into a majestic ivied castle on the surface of this new
realm, a group of revelers immediately disperse in screaming disarray and boundless fear. The outsider nervously looks about him to locate what might be lurking nearby, and soon approaches an abnormal-looking entity in which he beholds "in full, frightful vividness the inconceivable, indescribable, and
unmentionable monstrosity which had by its simple appearance changed a merry company to a herd
of delirious fugitives" (H.P. Lovecraft Tales 112). Tragically, the abomination is his own reflection in a
mirror as he learns after reaching out to the foul-smelling, abhorrent thing from another world only to
touch the smooth, polished surface of a reflecting glass. Hence, in both of these stories, as well as
many others, the image of an inscrutable reality is immediately comprehended as an aspect or component of oneself. Exposed to the representation of absolute exteriority, to that which we can never
inscribe within a closed system of values, we nonetheless directly observe in the mediation of imagery
and visual metaphors an empty amalgamation of life buried deep within its own reflection.
The last statement is paradoxical but not therefore inaccurate or implausible. What cannot be fully
portrayed in Lovecraft's fiction, the monstrous secrets and wonders of an archaic life, is at the same
time an immediate reality. The paradox, of course, is that the infinite (or what Lovecraft refers to as
the obscure, forbidden, unmentionable) resides both beyond and within the concrete finitude of human conceptions. In this way it is transcendent as well as immanent, precisely insofar as it pervades
all things without thereby being reduced to any particular aspect or manifestation. What does seem
implausible, however, is that there might be degrees of immanence through which we could measure
our proximity to what is absolutely Other. It is often argued, as elaborated in this essay, that our
basic, constitutive relation to the outside has been foreclosed by the homogenizing techniques of
modern and postmodern power. If, however, we begin to question the distinction between servility
and sovereignty, or the symbolic and the simulacrum, as laid out by several apocalyptic romantics, we
will also need to rethink how the radical, infinite Other has been put to use in political and philosophical debates. The argument defended here is that the causal connection between a general, allencompassing catastrophe and our fetishistic disavowal, or sterilized assimilation, of something infinitely sublime, accursed, and nameless is a hyperbolic position in need of rigorous scrutiny. That is not
to say that "specific" modes of repression or scapegoating are non-existent, as that would be ludicrous. The argument, as outlined and discussed in the body of this paper, rejects only the broad
claims of systemic violence and homogeneity — but not the evidence of violent hate or antagonism
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arising out of nuanced historical encounters (in which the other, for example, is sexually, ethnically, or
religiously marginalized). There is a significant difference between these two phenomena, as the first
is dubious while the second has been empirically verified.
Many have assumed that this distinction stems from a pragmatic or diacritical approach, as one
reads in the works of Jürgen Habermas and Richard Kearney. While there is some truth to this, the
comparison only goes so far. Kearney, for example, writes in his critique of radical deconstruction that
if the Other is infinitely Other, to the extent that our categories of sameness and difference share
nothing in common, then we have undercut our philosophical ability to formulate an ethical or political
position. But this in itself does not imply the irrelevance of our relationship to the very "thing" which
transcends our narrative tendencies. There need not be only two viable choices, a dynamic hermeneutic relationship with the Other or no connection at all. It could be, as intimated throughout Lovecraft's
works, that the inside and the outside overlap even as we find ourselves infinitely surpassed by the
form of exteriority which permeates us in every possible way. This acknowledgement is not an easy
one to make, as it suggests something impenetrable about ourselves; but it is more promising, ethically and politically speaking, than the misguided notion that a certain kind of proper relationship with
the unknown will harness its heterogeneity and thereby avert impending catastrophe. Further inquiry
along these lines, far from putting an end to the need for ethical dialogue or self-transformation,
would at least remind us that there is always a limit to our historicizing propensities.
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